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Russian Federation: Executive Branch  
By Susan Cavan 
 
PRESIDENCY 
Get tougher! 
At a cabinet meeting on February 21, President Putin instructed Interior Minister 
Rashid Nurgaliyev to "get tougher" on "bandits" in the Caucasus (for a more 
detailed discussion of MVD activities, which Nurgaliyev reported to Putin at this 
meeting, please see Security Services below).  (1)  The only surprising thing 
about this admonition is that Putin hasn't taken his own advice.  
 
While Putin's response to September's jarring attack in Beslan – holding an 
hours' long meeting with foreign journalists, specialists, and academics and then 
turning inward to attack Russia's diffusion of governance (such as it was) by 
tightening vertical control over the regions -- is strikingly weak, certainly by 
Putin's standards, for those who wonder how long the rule of the sword (and the 
shield) will last, it is a red flag.  Hence we see evidence of opposition to Putin 
unimagined since the electoral rout of the 2003 parliamentary elections:  
Dissatisfaction and criticism with the handling of the Beslan hostage crisis, 
especially among the families of the children; the failure and attendant criticism of 
administrative reform; Ukraine's rejection of Putin's attempts to influence voters 
in their presidential election; pensioners taking to the streets throughout Russia 
to protest the monetization of benefits; cracks in the cohesion of the Kremlin 
apparat, as insiders tussle for authority; and, perhaps most surprisingly, the 
appearance of an opposition candidate a full three years before the next 
(scheduled) presidential election. 
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Former Prime Minister Mikhail Kasianov did not, apparently, call a press 
conference to announce as a potential contender in 2008, but rather to publicize 
his new consultancy endeavor. (2)  Nonetheless, Kasianov not only dropped a 
"coy" hint at presidential ambitions by responding to a direct question on his 
presidential ambitions with "everything is possible;" he went further in his 
criticism of the current executive, "The main thing is that whoever comes to 
power [in the next election] spearheads a movement toward democratic values."  
(3) 
 
Already, analysts are handicapping Kasianov's chances and, again, a familiar 
name surfaces as the potential kingmaker.  Andrei Ryabov of the Carnegie 
Moscow Center claims, "If Kasianov means business, Anatoli Chubais will back 
him." (4)  It is interesting to note that among Kasianov's perks, remnants of his 
tenure as Prime Minister, are not only bodyguards and his Moscow residence, 
but "a direct line to the Kremlin." (5)  
 
What is not disclosed however, is just who answers at the other end of 
Kasianov's Kremlin hotline. 
 
Within the Kremlin, there are traces of infighting, which appear magnified when 
compared to the remarkable stillness of apparat waters during most of Putin's 
administration.  The division between "liberal economists" and siloviki has been 
evident for some time; there is now, however, actual cross-pollination of spheres 
as economists venture into the security sphere (as in the case of P.M. Fradkov 
addressing MVD and FSB officials) and siloviki (such as presidential aide Viktor 
Ivanov) hold forth on the tariff regime before the Customs Service. (6)  
Speculation over the cause of past appointments (e.g., Dmitri Kozak being 
transferred to the Caucasus in order to get him out of Moscow) and rumors of 
new personnel moves (apparently, current Drug Czar Viktor Cherkesov is 
anxious for a higher profile post and has his eyes on the FSB chief spot) are as 
rampant today as they were during any of Yel'tsin's unfathomable absences 
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throughout his administration.  If access to the texts of decrees was as open 
today as it was in the nineties, it would be interesting to compare the number of 
decrees promulgated now to those that would appear during any of the famous 
Yel'tsin "holidays."  The variety of decrees and, in particular, the number issued 
that directly contradicted those issued just days earlier, provided a remarkable 
"kremlinological" tool for gauging the membership and relative strength of 
apparat factions. 
 
Putin's missteps in Ukraine, inaction and inability to protect Russian citizens, 
(especially in southern Russia), and curtailing of democratic development, which 
garnered heavy international criticism, have left him weakened, and there appear 
to be few rallying to rebuild his tarnished image.  For some, Putin likely burnt 
bridges of support after turning on the financial kingpins behind the "Family" that 
brought him to power; for others, Putin is either too weak or slow in bringing the 
military in line with the "security agenda," and, of course, there are those who 
have continued simply to toil in the economic and financial minefields as Russia 
lurches (on the back of its oil reserves) toward a vigorous GDP.  None of these 
groups have a particular urgent motivation to prop up Putin's sagging 
administration.  However, that does not mean that they will not find suitable 
motivation should a threatening political force appear. 
 
Putin, on his own (or Putinists, sinn féin) 
The reverberations from Ukraine's Orange Revolution are still echoing across 
Central Eurasia, but if Kommersant has its story right (and there is some debate 
about that), then Putin and his team already have set to work creating a mass 
student organization to replace the "Walking Together" movement.  Nashi, or Our 
Own is being organized by Kremlin Deputy Chief Vladislav Surkov, together with 
Walking Together's creator, Vasili Yakemenko.  Surkov has reportedly met with 
youth activists in St. Petersburg to formulate the foundation of a movement that 
will have branches in major urban areas across Russia and hopes someday to 
boast a membership of 200-250,000.  
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Funding reportedly will be provided by Kremlin-favored oligarchs, who hope their 
business interests will benefit from a stable Putin administration.  Perhaps 
Surkov and these Putin supporters hope that any mass demonstrations by 
students in Russia can be diverted through an alternative source of young, urban 
groups controlled, at least politically, by the Kremlin (or one faction therein). 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) RTR Russia TV, 1100 GMT, 21 Feb 05; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
(2) The Moscow Times, 25 Feb 05 via ISI Emerging Markets Database.  
Kasianov's new consulting agency, MK-Analytika will, no doubt, benefit from the 
publicity attending his announcement, but if opposition to Putin was not 
"bankable," Kasianov would not have employed this tactic. 
(3) Ibid. 
(4) Gazeta, 25 Feb 05; What the Papers Say (WPS) via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database. 
(5) Ibid. 
(6) Gazeta.ru website, 17 Feb 05; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
(7) Kommersant, 21 Feb 05; WPS via Lexis-Nexis. Ekho Moskvy, 21 Feb 05  had 
a report of the new movement, "Nashi," drawn from the Kommersant report, but 
also ran comments by the alleged founder of the new movement (and former 
head of Walking Together, Vasili Yakemenko, that "what Kommersant is saying 
is simply ridiculous." (Ekho Moskvy, 21 Feb 05, 0745 GMT; BBC Monitoring via 
Lexis-Nexis). 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Eric Beene 
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The tactics security forces displayed in the somewhat lopsided confrontation 
between Russian security forces and reported terrorists in Makhachkala, 
Dagestan (described in the last NIS), which included the use of a tank to destroy 
the building in which the terrorists were holed up, appear to have become 
standard operating procedure for the security services, as evidenced by the 
similar tactics displayed in another such operation later in January.  These tactics 
appear to be part of a new Kremlin plan in the Caucasus that includes greater 
force and more frequent raids, increased rhetoric and even a de-Chechenization 
of security in the region (possibly withdrawing support from the clement Chechen 
regime), although it is not clear how well the plan is being coordinated at this 
point. 
 
On the last weekend in January, security forces began what became a two-day 
operation against suspected terrorists in Nalchik, Kabardino-Balkaria.  Available 
details are less than clear, but it appears the first stop for FSB and regional 
Interior Ministry agents was a house to arrest two suspected terrorists plus a 
woman alleged to have lived with the suspect in last August's Rizhskaya subway 
bombing.  Successful in that encounter, agents then proceeded to apprehend 
three more suspects in a nearby apartment building, where they met with less 
success.  After spending Saturday attempting to negotiate with the three in the 
five-story structure, several dozen police and special forces personnel raided the 
building Sunday morning with what was described as "heavy artillery, armored 
vehicles and gas."  The building was said to have been ablaze when the raid was 
concluded.  (1)  All terrorists within (reports vary, claiming three or four, including 
women) were reportedly killed.  Initially, authorities were tight-lipped on the 
operation, perhaps because of the presence of women among the dead alleged 
terrorists, or perhaps because of the scale of the operation in contrast, again, 
with the number of terrorists.  More complete reports did not appear in the media 
until the last week of February, along with words, which have become almost 
boilerplate that tied the suspected terrorists to Aslan Maskhadov and Shamil 
Basayev.    
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Accompanying these later, more complete reports were descriptions of other, 
less publicized, similar action—160 police and FSB troops killed a single "rebel 
militant" in Karachayevo-Cherkessia, and an unreported number of special forces 
personnel killed terrorist leader and al-Qaeda emissary Abu Dzeit, along with two 
other accomplices, in an Ingushetian village.  Not surprisingly, much more was 
made of the latter event, including claims that Abu Dzeit distributed al-Qaeda 
funds throughout the Caucasus and that he was personally involved in the June 
2004 Ingushetia attack and the Beslan siege in September 2004.  Perhaps also 
not surprisingly, Kommersant questioned these claims, both the fact that Abu 
Dzeit was killed and that he was as influential as FSB reports made him out to 
be.  (2)  The suspicion regarding the identity claim, certainly, is to be expected:  
following the January Makhachkala incident (see previous NIS Obs), government 
agents reported that Rasul Makasharipov was among the dead.  Makasharipov 
later posted a statement on the Chechen Kavkaz Center website stating that he 
was, in fact, alive and well and would continue to fight.  (3)  
 
Such tactics were put on display for all to see on a Channel One TV report in 
February highlighting an interdepartmental anti-terror exercise in the Moscow 
Region.  The report showcased the government's new GROU, or operational 
command groups, combining forces from the Interior Ministry, the FSB, the 
Defense Ministry and the Emergency Ministry.  In the presentation, the forces, 
"[a] mini army . . . helicopters, special troops and armoured hardware," were 
under the command of a single person from the Interior Ministry, in this case 
Colonel General Nikolai Rogozhkin.  This GROU appears to be an Interior 
Ministry-led team.  The report stated that such groups already have been "set up 
in 12 parts of the Southern Federal District" in the second half of 2004 (although 
not specifically as a result of the Beslan siege) and had shown their success in 
the Makhachkala and Nalchik raids.  The report also claimed that the Interior 
Ministry was "drafting a proposal to set up such units all over Russia, not only in 
the Southern Federal District." (4) 
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There are two common themes with these events:  First, security services have 
stepped up their actions significantly, using large force elements from multiple 
agencies to capture or, more often, kill even a solitary terrorism suspect.  All of 
these events appear to get a spotlight, even if it comes into focus only some 
weeks after the fact, but that obviously begs the question, What are we not 
seeing? And second, all of these relatively high-profile actions, which include 
claims of direct links to al-Qaeda and the deaths of the highest-ranking members 
of the separatist terror movement, have taken place outside of Chechnya, 
although typically in adjacent regions.  Perhaps this answers the begged 
question—scant news from Chechnya proper does not necessarily mean scant 
action.  It is quite possible similar events are occurring there as well, but without 
success, publicity is of no use.  Besides, the threat to Russian security has 
manifested itself as terrorist acts outside Chechen borders; success in deterring 
and denying terrorist freedom of action and movement in adjacent areas is much 
more clearly painted as success in Russia's war on terror. 
 
Russian president Vladimir Putin clearly and publicly approves of such tactics.   
Following the Nalchik raid, he was quoted as saying, "I think you should tie up all 
the loose ends that could appear in the process of investigating this [Nalchik] 
affair . . .You should work like this in the future, and treat [the terrorists] more 
severely."  He praised Interior Minister Rashid Nurgaliyev and the Interior 
Ministry-led efforts and charged him with further toughening Interior Ministry 
efforts to combat terrorism in the region. (5)  
 
However, Dmitri Kozak, Putin's envoy to the Southern Federal District, evidently 
has concerns. Specifically, he has criticized the "system of control" over anti-
terror actions in the Southern Federal District.  He claims that in Chechnya 
specifically, government organizations have been "piled on one another" with no 
single agency bearing responsibility for overall coordination.  "There are 13 
regions in the Southern federal district.  The FSB is in charge of the war on 
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terrorism in some of them, while the Interior Ministry is in charge in others."  
Acknowledging the newly created counter-terror groups (GROUs), evidently 
there is some confusion over who is in command:  technically, regional leaders 
should be in charge, however, specially-trained Interior Ministry personnel have 
been inserted into the chain of command.  One official familiar with the situation 
claimed that the system is ineffective:  "There is nobody in the Interior Ministry or 
Defense Ministry to hold accountable for failed operations." (6) 
 
In an attempt to alleviate his frustration, Kozak has drafted a presidential decree 
that would put the FSB in charge of anti-terror operations throughout the region, 
countering a move by President Putin last June in which he designated the FSB 
in charge of anti-terror efforts throughout Russia except for the Southern District, 
which falls under Interior Ministry authority.  This would also run counter to a 
proposed anti-terror bill under consideration in the Duma that would give the lead 
for such efforts to regional leaders.  Kozak's plan would rely on commanders of 
regional FSB directorates to chair local anti-terror commissions and command a 
headquarters for counter-terror operations.  Such a change would have to be 
incorporated into the proposed legislation.  (7) 
 
This may be part of a larger Kremlin plan to de-emphasize Chechen participation 
in its efforts in the region.  In late 2002, the Kremlin began a policy of 
"Chechenization," whereby Chechens themselves were enlisted in the Russian 
fight against separatist terrorists, lessening the Russians' war-fighting burden.  
This policy appears to have been less than successful, following numerous 
incidents of terrorist-led violence not just within Chechnya, but throughout Russia 
as well.  Following the death of pro-Moscow presidential choice Akhmad Kadyrov 
last May, the Kremlin inserted the former Chechen Interior Minister, Alu 
Alkhanov, into the post, but owing to competition from others (Ruslan Yamadaev, 
Ramzan Kadyrov, and Aslanbek Aslakhanov) for influence in the region, or 
perhaps simply due to incompetence, the region's security situation has 
deteriorated. (8)   
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Kozak's proposal would draw a more direct line of control from Moscow to the 
fielded forces, bypassing regional leaders.  It has the added benefit of relying on 
the president's own FSB over the Interior Ministry, despite their apparent status 
in the region.  But it does put him in direct confrontation with Interior Ministry 
chief Rashid Nurgaliyev, who is himself under attack from Prime Ministry Mikhail 
Fradkov who has charged the Interior Ministry with uncontrolled corruption.  (9)  It 
also puts his desires at odds with the proposed anti-terror legislation, but 
President Putin himself has expressed some concern with that legislation as well.  
This could be a simple case of Kozak's frustration with the status quo and the 
lack of effective security in the region, or it could be a political move for position 
as the landscape is drawn prior to 2008.  In either case, it is a dangerous game 
to play without a larger plan in sight.  Certainly a more rational plan for 
coordinating counter-terror activities is in order, and no single agency has proven 
itself spectacularly capable of executing such operations in the past.  Kozak's 
criticism of the current state of affairs, which puts the Interior Ministry in charge of 
anti-terror operations in one highly volatile part of the country while the FSB 
retains in control elsewhere is valid.  His solution may be a good one, but if it is 
simply politically motivated, it is likely to be no more effective than the current 
arrangement. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) Anna Arutunyan, "Troops Confront More Terror Cells In North Caucasus," 
The Moscow News, 23 Feb 05 via ISI Emerging Markets; Russia: "Kabarda 
Police Chief Shies Away From Speaking On Nalchik Siege," text of report by The 
Caucasus Times web site, BBC Monitoring, 7 Feb 05 via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(2) Anna Arutunyan, "Troops Confront More Terror Cells In North Caucasus," 
The Moscow News, 23 Feb 05 via ISI Emerging Markets; and "Abu Zeit – Terror 
Kingpin Or Small Fish?" Chechnya Weekly, Volume VI, Issue 8, 23 Feb 05, The 
Jamestown Foundation. 
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(3) "Security Forces Again Battle Dagestani MilitantsŠ" Chechnya Weekly, Vol. 
VI, Number 6, 9 Feb 05, The Jamestown Foundation.  
(4) "Russian Power Agencies Drill Troops For Joint Fight Against Terrorism," 
Text of report by Russian Channel One TV, 18 Feb 05, BBC Monitoring via 
Lexis-Nexis. 
(5) Judith Ingram and Said Tsarnayev, "Putin Calls For Tougher Action In The 
Caucasus," The Moscow Times, 22 Feb 05, p. 3; available online at 
(http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2005/02/22/011.html). 
(6) Natalia Slavina, "Responsibilities For Fighting Terror Should Be Personified—
Envoy," Itar-TASS, 21 Feb 05 via Lexis-Nexis; and Natalia Gorodetskaya, "The 
F.S.B. Will Be Placed In Charge," Kommersant, 24 Feb 05, p. 3 via ISI Emerging 
Markets. 
(7) Natalia Gorodetskaya, "The F.S.B. Will Be Placed In Charge," Kommersant, 
24 Feb 05, p. 3 via ISI Emerging Markets; and Nabi Abdullaev, "Police Role May 
Pass Back To FSB," The Moscow Times, 25 Feb 05 via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(8) Andrei Smirnov, "Russian Security Officials Want To End Chechenization," 
Chechnya Weekly, Vol VI, Issue 8, 25 Feb 05, The Jamestown Foundation. 
(9) Simon Saradzhyan, " Police Force Gets A Dressing Down," The Moscow 
Times, 17 Feb 05 via ISI Emerging Markets. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Rebecca Mulder 
 
"Russia's ŒSpecial' Path?" 
President Bush and President Putin emerged from their private summit meeting 
in Bratislava, Slovakia and presented themselves as a united front, standing 
together on issues of mutual concern and underemphasizing areas of 
disagreement between the two states. With Russian press headlines like 
"Friendship won the day" (Vremya novosti),  "Gas in exchange for democracy" 
(Vedomosti) and  "Putin can be trusted when he talks about democracy" 
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(Izvestia), it would seem that the summit was a vote of confidence in Putin from 
Bush, allowing the Russian leader to return home after successfully handling 
criticisms on the key issue of Russian democracy. 
 
During the public press conference following the private meeting between the two 
leaders, Bush made some "soft" statements concerning democracy, making it 
clear that a democratic system for Russia is important to maintaining a solid 
U.S.-Russian relationship. However, these statements did not reflect sharp 
criticism for Putin's specific consolidation of power, suppression of the media, the 
conflict with Chechnya or general backsliding on democratic values. Bush 
mentioned rule of law, the protection of minorities, a free press and a viable 
political opposition but only to say that "democracies have [these] certain things 
in common" and that "in the 21st century, strong countries are built by developing 
strong democracies."  (1) He expressed concern that Russia may not be fulfilling 
its commitment to universal democratic principles but was conciliatory in 
recognizing that Russia is changing, that he "applaud[s] President Putin for 
dealing with a country that is in transformation." (2) Overall, Bush concluded that 
the two men "found a lot of agreement, a lot of common ground, and the world is 
better for it" and that "the common ground is a lot more than those areas where 
we disagree." (3) 
 
Putin responded that this "dialogue of interested partners" was a reflection of 
joint efforts "to accumulate a unique cooperation." (4) His public remarks 
centered on the areas of cooperation between Russia and the U.S., especially 
international security. The fight against terrorism, specifically measures to 
neutralize systems of financing and recruiting of terrorists, to stem the illicit trade 
of MANPADS, and to stop proliferation in Iran and North Korea.  Economic 
cooperation and the possible accession of Russia to the WTO, the expansion of 
the operation of U.S. oil companies in Russian energy markets, cooperation in 
the provision of liquefied natural gas from Russia to the U.S. (set for 2010-2011), 
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and general bilateral investment cooperation are other areas of interest the two 
states are supposed to continue to pursue jointly. 
 
When pressed by reporters on the issue of his attitude toward Putin, Bush stated 
that Putin is the "kind of fellow who, when he says, yes, he means yes, and when 
he says no, he means, no" and that "yes meant yes, when we talked about the 
values that we share." (5) 
 
Putin claimed that Russia made a choice for democracy fourteen years ago and 
that "any kind of turn towards totalitarianism for Russia would be impossible, due 
to the condition of Russian society." (6) Putin stated that "we are not going 
toŠinvent any kind of special Russian democracy" but that "the principles of 
democracy should be adequate to the current status of the development of 
Russia, to our history and our traditions." (7) Putin's idea of the essence of 
democracy is to "strengthen statehood and it should improve living standards for 
the people." (8) 
 
It seems that in the discussion of democracy, Putin and Bush may speak a 
slightly different language. The same words may have different meanings. As 
new waves of liberation roll through the Caucasus and Ukraine (and, perhaps, 
Central Asia), Putin and other post-Soviet leaders are faced with challenges to 
authoritarian leadership and a probable geopolitical reorientation of democratized 
republics, thus undermining Russian-led efforts to create an alternative bloc in 
post-Soviet Eurasia. (9) On the eve of the summit, Putin spoke to Slovak 
journalists and said that he could not understand the logic of "imposing" 
democracy on the states of Russia's "near abroad." He remarked, "If democracy 
doesn't work in the post-Soviet countries – as some people seem to believe – 
what's the need to introduce it there?" (Š) "But if we introduce democratic 
principles [into these countries' political systems], why then do we need 
revolutions there?" (10) Putin and other CIS leaders are pushing an "adaptation" 
of democratic principles and institutions in their countries, to cite Russian 
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Defense Minister Sergei Lavrov, "Democracy is not a potato and cannot be 
readily transplanted from one field to the other." (11) In fact, Russia is concerned 
with asserting hegemony in post-Soviet territories, and their democratization 
constitutes an obstacle. 
 
The idea of an "adapted democracy" as described by Putin was criticized by 
Anna Politkovskaya in a recent Novaya gazeta article and she likened it to the 
term "creeping authoritarianism" that some in the U.S. have used to describe 
Russia's political system. Politkovskaya states that the democratic hopes for 
Russia haven't come true – "because of oligarchs, then the illness of Yel'tsin, a 
war, a collapse of the freedom of speech, losing the qualities of parliament by the 
parliament, decease of the opposition" – and that these developments took place 
in much of the post-Soviet arena, disabling hopes for democracy there, as well. 
(12) The reporter believes that no "adapted democracy" would help Russia, and 
would be as likely to fail as what's been termed Russia's current "managed 
democracy." (13) She also notes that "the Kremlin is free to accentuate our 
originality and Russia's peculiar way as long as it wants to" but that the modern 
reality demonstrates that the quality of a state is a product of the equality of its 
elites which, in ideal situations, "pull up their nation." (14) 
 
Perhaps, as Politkovskaya implies, the question of a future democratic Russia 
lies with the potential desires of the masses, denigrated by an observer with 
Novaya gazeta as "millions of indifferent lumpkins" who, as a recent poll from 
Vision (as reported by Profil magazine), indicated that 20-30% pay virtually no 
attention to developments in foreign affairs and almost as many (20-25%) "are 
inclined to drastic fluctuations in their assessment of Russia's foreign policy 
course, under the influence of the media."(15) On the whole, the same poll 
shows, Russians show a 65-70% approval rating of the president's actions 
overall, and he is the most trusted politician in Russia at the moment, although 
according to the Public Opinion Foundation (FOM), Putin is not really perceived 
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as a politician, because a politician is someone who is struggling for power: "He's 
not fighting for power; a tsar is not a politician in a monarchy." (16) 
 
Putin may describe his desire for an "adapted democracy" and U.S. officials may 
describe it as "creeping authoritarianism," underscoring concerns that Russia has 
moved and continues to move away from democratic values and institutions, but 
what President Bush seemed to take away from this rather anti-climatic summit, 
was that "the most important statementŠwas the [Russian] President's 
statement, when he declared his absolute support for democracy in Russia, and 
they're not turning back. To me, that is the most important statement of my 
private meeting and it's the most important statement of this public press 
conference. And I can tell you what it's like dealing with the man over the last four 
years: When he tells you something, he means it." (17) If this is true, then Putin 
means what he says when he promotes an "adapted democracy."  But if this is 
not the democracy Bush speaks of, if Putin's adaptations are ultimately 
antithetical to Western democratic principles and institutions, then Putin will be a 
man of his word in upholding a very different kind of political system than Bush 
envisions.  
 
Source Notes: 
 
1) White House Office of the Press Secretary via Johnson's Russia List (JRL), 24 
Feb 05, #8-JRL 9068 via (www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/9068-8.cfm). 
2) Ibid. 
3) Ibid. 
4) Ibid. 
5) Ibid. 
6) Ibid. 
7) Ibid. 
8) Ibid. 
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9) The Eurasia Daily Monitor (The Jamestown Foundation), 25 Feb 05, "Different 
Understanding of Democracy May Put Bush and Putin on Collision Course" by 
Igor Torbakov via (www.jamestown.org). 
10) Ibid. 
11) Ibid. 
12) What the Papers Say via ISI Emerging Markets, 25 Feb 05 via 
(http://site.securities.com/doc.html?pc=RU&doc_id=69520708). 
13) Ibid. 
14) Ibid. 
15) Ibid. 
16) Ibid. 
17) Ibid., White House Office of the Press Secretary via JRL, 24 Feb 05. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Robyn Angley 
 
Toward civil society influence? 
The bill for the establishment of a public chamber passed its second reading on 
February 18. The law is slated to have its final reading in early March and go into 
effect on July 1. A number of amendments aimed at making the chamber more 
transparent were cut. The resulting public chamber will consist of 126 members. 
The president will appoint one third of the members or 42 people. Those 
presidential appointees will select a second group of 42 culled from national non-
governmental organizations (NGOs). The remaining third will be chosen by the 
first 84 members and will be drawn from regional NGOs. Representatives from 
regional NGOs will be recruited using regional conferences. The conferences are 
not required to be publicized; there is also no minimum number of groups 
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required to participate. These factors leave the process open to easy 
manipulation. 
 
Analysts predict that the public chamber will force a rift between human rights 
organizations that are willing to cooperate with the government and those that 
are not. (1)  Some have complained about the fact that the public chamber's 
pronouncements will be advisory and will not carry the force of law. While it is 
clear that it should not be the responsibility of an unwieldy public chamber to 
balance the actions of the executive, Putin's post-Beslan reforms so denuded the 
legislative branch that public oversight was left to the newly-created chamber. 
The erosion of even its rudimentary functions along with the usurption of 
appointment prerogatives lessens further the value of democratic governance in 
Putin's Russia. 
 
However, the public chamber model could serve as an effective mechanism of 
public accountability if the media serve their function as providers of information 
and report on the chamber's reactions to laws. Media coverage of the chamber 
could serve as a mechanism to increase transparency. Unfortunately, the current 
state of the media in Russia makes thorough coverage of the chamber's activities 
unlikely. The media's reaction to the chamber's pronouncements will be a key 
determinant of the chamber's efficacy. 
 
A legitimate cause for concern lies in the infrequency of the public chamber's 
meetings and in its administrative structure. The chamber is set to meet only 
twice annually; its daily activities will be overseen by a small staff led by an 
official appointed by the government. Delegating daily direction of the chamber's 
activities to someone who is responsible to the prime minister and the president 
allows much room for manipulation. Perhaps someone who is voted on by the 
public chamber should assume those responsibilities. 
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Several key human rights organizations such as Memorial already have stated 
their intention not to participate in the public chamber. (2)  The lack of 
transparency in the assigned operations of the organization raises concerns that 
the president will use the chamber to claim the approval of civil society when it 
may be, in fact, manipulated or coerced. The non-participation of groups that 
might wield influence will weaken the effectiveness and legitimacy of the 
organization. It does not mean, however, that the public chamber is doomed to 
serve as another powerless public body. As with many situations in Russia, in the 
(unlikely) event that the members of the public chamber (or heads of regional 
governments, for example) are willing to act independently of those who 
appointed them, the system could function effectively because of appropriate 
checks and balances. Unfortunately, the nature of political power is such that 
allegiance is likely to go to the one who is best able to ensure the continuance of 
one's own personal power. If that political reality wins out in the public chamber, 
then Russia has just witnessed the birth of yet another rubberstamping 
scapegoat. While convenient to have around, they're not good for much more 
than affirmative bleating. 
 
A glance at the media 
There are several reasons to cover events in a media system that is dominated 
by government-owned media or is highly government influenced. First, coverage 
ensures that people know what the government is doing for them. It presents the 
government spin on things and makes it look as though politicians are earning 
the money they are receiving (or the benefits they are receiving in the case of the 
state Duma, which - somewhat hypocritically - recently defeated a bill proposing 
the monetization of parliamentary benefits). Second, newspapers provide an 
important public service by notifying their audience of issues that are likely to 
have an impact on them. In this way, the media serves as a sort of public 
information system. Third, the media has to report on significant events that 
many people know about, otherwise they lose credibility. 
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Russia's media and government have come under fire in recent years, the former 
for self-censorship and the latter for tighter control of media content and tougher 
treatment of journalists. These allegations have some foundation. For example, 
the FSB recently ordered the deportation of Yuri Bagrov, a Radio Liberty 
correspondent for the North Caucasus, under claims that he used falsified 
documents to establish Russian citizenship. Bagrov, whose mother and wife are 
Russian, was granted a reprieve by the North Ossetian Interior Ministry on 
February 23, but not before restrictions on his freedom of movement had 
prevented him from covering the Chechen presidential elections in August and 
the Beslan hostage-taking. (3) 
 
Incidents such as Bagrov's aside, the Russian media cover more events and 
issues than the reasoning mentioned above would suggest. Western 
researchers, including those who contribute to this publication, rely on the 
Russian media as sources for the information they analyze.  As much as Russia 
is attacked for its restrictions on the media and the way it keeps government 
criticism from being voiced, opposition opinions are still voiced in some 
newspapers and events unfavorable to the government, such as the pensioners' 
protests, are still being covered. As much as they do wrong, it should be 
acknowledged that the Russian media are still doing some things right. 
 
Of constitutional amendments and such 
The issue of amending the constitution as regards the president has resurfaced. 
Drafts have been written proposing the appointment of the president by a state 
assembly. The president would not have a heavy concentration of power. The 
prime minister, on the other hand, would have a great degree of direction over 
the government. Not surprisingly, one name to surface as a potential prime 
minister was that of Vladimir Putin. Despite all the talk, State Duma speaker 
Boris Gryzlov announced that his faction, which holds the majority in the Duma, 
would "use it for preserving the existing Constitution." (4)  Gryzlov's avowals 
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aside, given the Duma's record of collaboration with the Kremlin, it seems 
unlikely that a constitutional amendment, if pressed, will be rejected.  
 
Reforms and no confidence 
A no confidence vote in the government, proposed by the Communists, was 
voted down on February 9. The vote was a direct result of the social upheaval 
caused by the poor implementation of the monetization of benefits scheme 
passed by the Duma in August. The Communists attempted to position 
themselves (largely after the fact) as the leaders of the protest, even scheduling 
additional rallies. Rumors of impending shifts in the government persist although 
Putin has resisted intimations that he may fire one or more of his ministers. The 
Duma is requesting a report from Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov on benefit 
reform in late March. (5) In response to the protests, the Duma raised the amount 
of money allotted for benefits, drawing primarily from the stabilization fund. The 
International Monetary Fund has issued a warning to Russia, stating that the 
stabilization fund should not be subject to further infringements unless for the 
purpose of paying off Russia's external debt. (6)  Meanwhile, the protests 
continue.  
 
Source Notes: 
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Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Jeff Kubiak and Kyle Colton 
 
INTERNAL 
The gravest threat 
It is little wonder that the most highly publicized area of agreement between 
Presidents Bush and Putin at their recent summit was on the issue of nuclear 
security cooperation.  In the joint statement released after the summit, Bush and 
Putin proclaim that "The United States and Russia will enhance cooperation to 
counter one of the gravest threats our two countries face, nuclear terrorism." (1)  
This problem was emphasized by several high profile actors on both sides of the 
Atlantic recently.  Self-exiled oligarch Boris Berezovsky grabbed media headlines 
early in February when he advised the Kremlin that it should accept the Chechen 
proposed ceasefire and offer to negotiate, because, he claimed, he had received 
information that the Chechen rebels were in possession of a small nuclear 
explosive device. (2)  This report initiated a flood of speculation as to whether or 
not Berezovsky's claim was anything more than a political attention-grabbing 
stunt.  Although Russian authorities refused "to comment on the delirious 
statements of a person who is on the international wanted list," numerous experts 
refuted the idea that the Chechens actually could have come into possession of 
such a device. (3)  Nearly all experts agreed that it would be virtually impossible 
for the insurgents to explode such a device even if they had one.  Nonetheless, 
the media flurry that followed Berezovsky's comments, including several calls by 
members of the government and Duma to examine more thoroughly the 
possibility that his claim could be true, highlights the universal sensitivity to the 
perceived danger presented by the prospect of terrorist organizations gaining 
possession of a nuclear capability.  
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Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov was quick to claim that security of Russia's 
military nuclear facilities is world class and routinely provides media and other 
foreign observers opportunities to witness security exercises at nuclear military 
facilities.  "We pay very close attention to the issue of guarding and defending 
military facilities, and we are willing to show that the existing myths that Russia 
has problems in this area are indeed nothing but myths." (4)  A December 2004 
report by the U.S. National Intelligence Council, a think-tank that supports the 
U.S. intelligence community notes the efforts of the Russian Defense Ministry in 
a rare positive light.  According to the report, the Russian Defense Ministry is not 
the source of significant concern with regard to loose nukes.  However, the report 
documents numerous cases of stolen or lost nuclear material from Russian 
nuclear facilities that were under the jurisdiction of the Federal Agency for Atomic 
Energy.  Despite claims that all the material has been recovered; the report 
concludes, "that undetected smuggling has occurred, and we are concerned 
about the total amount of material that could have been diverted or stolen in the 
last 13 years." (5)  A similar alarm was sounded by U.S. Senator John 
Rockefeller, vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee.  Following a 
CIA briefing on security threats that face the U.S., Senator Rockefeller surely 
aimed to have an impact on the agenda of the U.S.-Russian Presidential summit 
when he insisted "a lot of those lost nuclear weapons can be out circulating in the 
terrorist community" and suggested that President Putin "ought to be very 
worried" that these weapons or materials could end up in the hands of Chechen 
separatists. (6)  According to Igor Ostretsov, the deputy director of the All-Russia 
Research Institute of Atomic Engineering, it would be technically possible for 
terrorists, in primitive conditions, to create a real atomic bomb out of spent 
nuclear fuel.  "The main preoccupation should be to ensure 100 percent security 
of spent nuclear fuel at power stations and at storage sites." (7)  In a radio report, 
Ekho Moskvy radio correspondent Andrei Gavrilov claimed that Chechen rebel 
field commander, Shamil Basayev, has on more than one occasion "declared 
readiness to resort to nuclear terrorism in Russian cities."  Gavrilov goes on to 
 22 
recount several instances where nuclear materials had been planted by terrorists 
in an effort to make a statement, and once, in 1998, in an apparent effort to 
explode a dirty bomb. (8)  Indeed, nuclear materials are loose in Russia.  They 
are loose in small quantities, as was evidenced this past November when a 
Russian geologist turned in plutonium that he had been storing in his garage 
after finding it in a garbage heap outside an abandoned laboratory in 1997 or 
1998. (9)  And, as Moscow military analyst Pavel Felgenhauer points out, 
hundreds of tons are vulnerable in the form of plutonium sitting in unsafe storage 
still awaiting completion of a new facility in the Urals. (10)  The U.S. has 
committed $1.6 billion this year under the Cooperative Threat Reduction program 
to push its oversight over the disposition of Russian nuclear weapons and 
material, without which it is assumed that the Russians could not hope 
adequately to secure the enormous amount of arms-grade nuclear material. (11) 
Russians are asked to balance their fear of the U.S. with their fear that Basayev 
will attempt to make good on his threat. 
 
Now it's legal 
Early in February the Duma passed, in its first reading, a bill that would allow 
Defense Ministry resources (troops and money) to be used domestically in the 
fight against terrorism. (12)  Purportedly part of the government's effort to 
respond to the Beslan tragedy, the new law serves only to legitimate the 
government's current counter-terrorism efforts in the North Caucasus rather than 
representing a new strategy.  It is common knowledge that units from the 
Defense Ministry's 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, which is permanently stationed 
in Chechnya, not only participate daily in military missions against Chechen 
rebels, but that, until recently, significant numbers of airborne troops also had 
been deployed to the mountainous regions of Chechnya to conduct operations.  
These units were contract soldiers belonging to the 76th Airborne Division 
stationed in Pskov and have since been redeployed.  Their missions were 
assumed subsequently by the contract soldier units of the 42nd Division. On a 
number of occasions, Ivanov has, bragged about the performance of his contract 
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soldiers in Chechnya: "These divisions are well known.  They proved quite 
efficient during counterterrorist operation in the North Caucasus.  It is there that 
the new approaches towards using army units and fighting illegal armed groups 
were first tested in the fight against international terrorism." (13)  On other 
occasions, Ivanov had been an outspoken opponent of using defense ministry 
forces in the counterterrorist struggle, saying that using the army to fight terrorists 
is like using a hammer to kill a mosquito. (14)  This picture was drawn very vividly 
in a recent article written by Nabi Abdullaev that recounts the keystone cop-like 
performance of security forces in two recent standoffs against small groups of 
terrorist.  The standoffs ended in both cases only after the army troops bulldozed 
terrorist-occupied houses with armored vehicles (in one case a tank, in another 
an armored personnel carrier) killing the terrorists inside. (15) 
 
The fact of the matter is that although the 42nd Division has been fully 
transitioned to contract soldiers, the new professionals still suffer from many of 
the old deficiencies.  The unit still has only outdated and worn out equipment, no 
modern communications gear, and the troops use their own money (at least they 
have some now) to purchase foreign made radios. (16)  Their flak jackets are 
damaged and not replaced and obsolete night vision equipment means that 
terrorists basically move with impunity at night.  Because the tours are longer, 
more time can be put into training the contract soldiers who now run through 
nearly 10 months of combat training before being put into action, as compared to 
the 5 months available to conscripts.  However, training is still limited to small 
groups of soldiers since regimental exercises are not possible for security 
reasons. (17) The contract forces still demonstrate the same lack of discipline, 
violence towards their fellow soldiers, and criminal behavior that all were 
emblematic of the conscripted force, and which vastly reduces their effectiveness 
and continues to reflect poorly on the government. (18) 
 
Retired General Makhmud Gareyev, President of the Academy of Military 
Sciences, claims that the government's real problem in its struggle against 
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terrorism is not the lack of firepower, but the disastrous lack of coordination 
between the three primary power ministries – defense, interior and Federal 
Security Service (FSB) – and the remarkably poor intelligence gathering effort 
demonstrated thus far. (19)  He observes that instead of improving efficiency, the 
new bill was designed to enhance the distance of the Kremlin and the FSB from 
criticism concerning their handling of the operation.  Having moved the primary 
coordination function for antiterrorism operations to the Interior Ministry last 
summer, this latest move puts another layer of scapegoats between any disaster 
and the Kremlin. 
 
Putin: defender of the soldier 
On 7 February, President Putin made an obvious effort to buy another insurance 
policy by portraying himself as the defender of the soldier.  In a televised cabinet 
meeting, Putin "dressed down" his ministers, specifically the Finance Minister 
Aleksei Kudrin, for not having responded with adequate speed and thoroughness 
to Putin's demand that military salaries are raised across the board. (20)  Back 
on 24 January, in response to rising political heat over the declining socio-
economic status of the military that was accelerated by the benefits reform 
enacted January 1, Putin instructed Kudrin to meet with Ivanov and develop the 
details to support a 20% pay raise for the military – and, to make it happen much 
sooner than the 1 September date suggested by Kudrin.  Putin had been made 
well aware that the armed forces would once again not see pay raises in 2005 
and that more than a third of military families would live below the poverty line.  
But Putin's overt demonstration of support for the military came only as the 
Kremlin began to feel the heat from the unpopular benefits reform combined with 
other political defeats the Kremlin has suffered recently.  While some in the 
media talk about the potential for a rebellion within the military, Felgenhauer 
thinks that Putin is far more concerned that the Russian military should not 
behave (or fail to act) as did the Ukrainian military, should civil unrest arise, but 
instead would defend the authorities. (21)  Putin's display on national television 
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reflects his hope that if he defends the soldier now, the soldier will return the 
favor in the future. 
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EXTERNAL  
Ukraine and NATO 
Ukraine inherited a huge Soviet-legacy military when it gained independence in 
1991.  While a powerful force, this military was designed as a component of the 
overall Soviet military apparatus and did not serve the evolving needs of the 
newly independent Ukraine.  Additionally, Ukraine did not possess its own 
military/civilian institutions due to the central command model of the Soviet-era 
forces.  The process of adapting the military into a truly Ukrainian force, capable 
of meeting Ukraine's security challenges, was slowed by the need to create its 
defense institutions, such as the National Security and Defense Council, Ministry 
of Defense, General Staff, Component Service Commands and Defense 
Academy.  NATO participation and assistance with Ukrainian military reform 
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started almost immediately after the country's independence and since President 
Viktor Yushchenko's ascendancy to power, the possibility for Ukrainian full 
membership in NATO looks brighter than ever. 
 
A history of cooperation 
NATO-Ukraine relations started in 1991 when Ukraine joined the North Atlantic 
Cooperation Council, now known as the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.  While 
politically and economically tied to Russia, Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma 
saw increasing ties with NATO as a way to lessen Russian influence.  In 1994, 
Ukraine became the first CIS country to join the Partnership for Peace (PfP).  
This NATO program was designed to enhance security and defense cooperation 
between NATO and individual countries. 
 
Russian disinclination to sign a treaty with Ukraine that would formally recognize 
Ukraine's borders, pushed Ukraine toward greater rapprochement with NATO.  In 
1997, Ukraine informed NATO that the Partnership for Peace program no longer 
met Ukraine's security needs and requested a special partnership agreement 
with NATO.   President Kuchma said, "NATO is an alliance of democratic and 
civilized states which do not threaten or pose territorial claims on anyone." (1)  
National Defense and Security Council chief Volodymyr Horbulin stated that 
"certain actions and statements by Russia's Duma and members of the Russian 
government force Ukraine to seek to protect its security in a security system." (2) 
 
While NATO and Russia were proceeding with talks about their new relationship, 
Ukraine moved to establish official relations with NATO and sign a special 
partnership agreement at the 1997 NATO Madrid Summit.  During NATO 
discussions, Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council head Volodymyr 
Horbulin, Foreign Minister Hennady Udovenko, and Defense Minister Oleksandr 
Kuzmuk agreed that the current military status of Ukrainian forces would not 
allow them to join NATO, but they reserved the option to apply for NATO 
membership in the future. 
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Ukraine's push for official NATO ties and discussions regarding membership 
impelled President Boris Yel'tsin to visit Kiev prior to the Madrid Summit.  In Kiev, 
Presidents Kuchma and Yel'tsin agreed in principle to the Ukrainian-Russian 
treaty.  The treaty was signed in May 1997 and ratified by the Russian parliament 
in December 1998 and February 1999.  The obvious lesson was that continued 
Ukrainian engagement with NATO provided Ukraine with leverage when dealing 
with Russia. 
 
Charter on a Distinctive Partnership and Partnership for Peace 
At the NATO Madrid Summit in July 1997, Ukraine signed the Charter on a 
Distinctive Partnership.  The document covered cooperation in the areas of 
economic security, conflict prevention, crisis management, military reform, 
including enhanced civilian control, non-proliferation, arms control and transfers, 
and combating drugs and organized crime.  Additionally, the Charter allows for 
expansion in all areas.  
 
Since signing the Distinctive Partnership Charter, the record of Ukraine-NATO 
cooperation has been impressive.  Ukraine frequently has hosted NATO military 
exercises for both ground and naval forces.  It has converted its Soviet-era 
Yavoriv military range, Europe's largest military training area, into a NATO 
peacekeeping training center.  It maintains a joint military unit, the Ukrainian-
Polish joint battalion, UkrPolBat, which participates in NATO peacekeeping 
missions.  The battalion joined the NATO peacekeeping mission in Kosovo under 
NATO command.  It also has been deployed to the Lebanese-Israeli border as 
part of UNIFIL. Ukraine has allowed nearly 1,200 military flights, mostly 
American, to transit Ukrainian airspace, en route to Afghanistan and Central 
Asia. 
 
Ukraine has established an outstanding record of Partnership for Peace 
participation.  Ukraine has taken part in almost 200 PfP events every year since 
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1999.  In addition to participation, Ukraine has hosted several annual PfP 
exercises.  The largest naval, air and amphibious exercise conducted by NATO 
in the former USSR was hosted by Ukraine in the Black Sea in June 2000.  The 
Annual ŒPeace-Shield' PfP exercise has also been hosted by Ukraine.  
 
Even more impressive, despite the ongoing political situation and some "hostile 
rhetoric" during 2004 in Ukraine, the Ukrainian military still participated in 220 
events within the framework of NATO's Partnership for Peace program. (3)  
Ukraine and the United States conducted joint naval exercises in the Black Sea 
in November 2004 that included Ukraine's flagship, the Hetman Sahaidachny, the 
Kostiantyn Olshansky large landing craft, and the United States' 6th Fleet 
command ship, the USS La Salle.  The exercise was conducted in advance of 
the Ukrainian Navy joining NATO's anti-terrorism operation, Active Endeavor, 
conducted in the Mediterranean Sea.  Ukraine is scheduled to join the operation 
in 2005. (4) 
 
Ukraine and NATO difficulties 
The Kosovo conflict was the first serious crisis in Ukrainian-NATO relations; 
President Leonid Kuchma's non-bloc, multi-vector foreign policy swung toward 
Russia, but Ukraine did not sever relations with NATO fearing that would lead to 
a break with the EU as well. While the NATO campaign in Kosovo did little to 
effect NATO-Ukraine relations, it did affect public perception of NATO even in 
Western Ukraine, which was solidly pro-NATO.  This perception has lingered 
since 1998 and will have to be overcome if Ukraine is going to pursue full 
membership.  
 
The second issue was the establishment of the NATO-Russia Council in May 
2002.  Previously, NATO had been careful not to elevate Russia over Ukraine in 
bilateral arrangements, so this new role for Russia in NATO caused concern for 
the impact on relations with Ukraine. However, on May 23, President Kuchma 
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decided to initiate preparations for the full membership of Ukraine in the alliance, 
and to draft a strategy to reach that goal. (5) 
 
At the NATO Prague Summit in November 2002, the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan 
was adopted.  While not part of the Membership Plan, the Action Plan set out 
specific goals, covering political and economic issues, information issues, 
security, defense and military issues, information protection and security, and 
legal issues.  NATO urged Ukraine to take the reform process forward and 
strengthen democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the market economy.  
NATO agreed to significantly step up its efforts to transform the defense and 
security institutions in Ukraine. 
 
  
 
To support the implementation of the Action Plan's objectives, Annual Target 
Plans are set for Ukraine to establish its own targets in terms of the activities it 
wishes to pursue both internally and in cooperation with NATO. Assessment 
meetings take place twice a year and a progress report is prepared annually.  
Despite the lack of progress in democracy, law, human rights and economy, the 
military has done surprisingly well in achieving its goals in both the NATO-
Ukraine 2003 and 2004 Target Plans.  
 
Military reforms despite political tensions 
While initially slow, Ukrainian military reform was stimulated by aggressive NATO 
involvement, specifically Poland.  In 2004, the Ukrainian Army was cut by 70,000 
personnel.  When Defense Minister Yevhen Marchuk was dismissed in 2004 due 
to an ammunition storing and disposal issue, President Leonid Kuchma told new 
Defense Minister Oleksandr Kuzmuk that military reform must be pursued further.  
"We must not dismiss those who benefit the armed forces. I am referring to 
military professionals," Kuchma said.  "We must depart from old approaches and 
stereotypes concerning military threats, and develop the armed forces on the 
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basis of the principle of a sufficient defense." (6)  One week before Kuchma's 
comments, NATO Military Committee chief Harald Kuyat had given high marks to 
the progress Ukraine's military reforms and said that the long-term plan for 
reform is "quite healthy." (7)  Kuyat said that all NATO evaluators noted the 
positive aspects of Ukrainian military reform and the "openness and sincerity" 
with which Ukraine made its report on this reform. 
 
In October 2004, the Ukrainian government announced plans to reduce its armed 
forces by 50,000 to 235,000 servicemen in 2005, according to Defense Minister 
Alexander Kuzmuk.  The reduction was in line with the approved, NATO-
endorsed Ukrainian armed forces reform.  Current servicemen will be dismissed 
in 2005, as opposed to previous years when reductions were made by trimming 
redundant positions and setting smaller conscription targets. (8) 
 
Since becoming president in December, Viktor Yushchenko has pushed for more 
military reforms.  Yushchenko wants the terms of conscription reduced from 18 
months to 12 months in the ground forces and from 24 months to 18 months in 
the Navy by the beginning of 2005.  More importantly, he wants a plan for the 
entire Armed Forces to switch over to a contract system by the beginning of 
January 2010.  In the fall of 2004, the first few combat units started a test period 
for the new contract system. (9) 
 
The Defense Ministry also has other problems such as an outdated monetary 
allowance system, a huge disparity between civilian and military pay and 
retirement issues. 
 
The Ukrainian Defense Minister has formed working groups to reform the system 
of monetary allowances and social bonuses and compensations to the 
servicemen and civilian personnel of the Armed Forces.  The main objective of 
the working group is to develop a concept for a new and more effective system of 
payment for all Ministry personnel, as well as to find ways to provide housing and 
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improve the mechanisms of social bonuses and compensations for servicemen 
and military pensioners.  The first meeting of the working group, held in February 
2005, discussed the issue of reforms of the monetary allowances, social bonuses 
and compensations to servicemen and civilian personnel of the Armed Forces, 
as well as the plan to address the reform concept. (10) 
 
The economy consequences of NATO membership 
In addition to continued military reforms, there are other issues raised by possible 
NATO membership that President Yushchenko has to take into account.  Ukraine 
was the sixth largest weapons exporter in terms of the overall volume of 
conventional arms supplies from 1999 to 2003.  During that period, Ukraine's 
weapons exports totaled 2.195 billion dollars. (11)  The concern in Ukraine and 
Russia is that the push toward NATO will undermine this component of Ukraine's 
economy.  Presidential candidate Viktor Yanukovich actually used this issue 
during his failed campaign.  He warned against pushing for NATO integration 
because this may cause Ukraine to "lose the entire military-industrial sector of 
the economy." (12)  "If we gear our policy only towards the development of 
relations with NATO and accession to this organization, we may lose a whole 
sector of the economy – the military-industrial one," he told Russian journalists 
on Monday.  "Because NATO standards will need to be introduced, we will have 
to close plants, and buy weapons and equipment in the West. We cannot allow 
this to happen," he said. (13) 
 
During a meeting of the Interparliamentary Russian-Ukrainian commission on 15 
February 2005, the Chairman of the CIS Affairs committee at Russia's Federation 
Council, Vadim Gustov, said that if Ukraine joins NATO then the volume of its 
arms and military equipment exports could dwindle considerably. (14) Gustov 
said that Ukraine's admission to NATO with its differing weapons standards and 
trade limitations would result in diminishing the export potential of the Ukrainian 
defense industry complex. (15) 
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While transforming the Ukrainian defense industry is a major internal problem for 
the new government, the external problem likely will be the transformation's 
impact on the Russian arms industry.  Many parts for Russian weapons systems 
are made in Ukraine.  Kiev's Research Center for the Army, Conversion and 
Disarmament Problems estimates that Ukraine exported approximately 600 
million dollars in weapons in 2004.  About one fourth of those exports were under 
contracts negotiated through Russia's Rosoboroneksport arms exporter, but 
Moscow's Center for the Analysis of Strategies and Technologies estimates the 
number closer to half. (16) 
 
Russian Industry and Energy Minister Viktor Khristenko estimates that 2,000 
businesses interact between the two countries in the arms industry and without 
this interaction it will not be possible to produce some products.  Russia does not 
produce the AA-10 Alamo (R-27) medium range air-to-air missile, but does often 
include these missiles when selling its aircraft throughout the world.  Numerous 
types of gas turbine engines for both ships and aircraft are produced by Ukraine 
at Motor Sich in Zaporizhzhya, not in Russia. (17)  No matter how quickly 
Ukraine moves toward NATO membership, it is unlikely that President 
Yushchenko could restructure completely Ukraine's defense industrial complex.  
However, NATO membership or even increased cooperation will force Ukrainian-
Russian defense exports to suffer. 
 
Ukraine's road toward NATO 
Since President Yushchenko's rise to power through the Orange revolution, he 
has made it clear that his policies will focus on European integration.  He was the 
only non-NATO head of state invited to the 22 February NATO meeting.  At that 
meeting, NATO leaders expressed support for Ukraine's reform agenda and 
agreed to strengthen cooperation with the country. 
 
At the special NATO-Ukraine Summit, President Yushchenko outlined to NATO 
Heads of State and Government his plans and priorities for the reform process in 
 34 
Ukraine.   "NATO is ready to work with you," ready to "sharpen and refocus" the 
existing cooperation,  NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said at a 
joint press conference with President Yushchenko. (18)  "Ukraine has made its 
position clear about joining the Membership Action Plan," he told reporters, "At 
the same time it means that our country will be also using the possibilities that 
are provided by the existing instruments for cooperation, meaning the Action 
Plan between NATO and Ukraine." (19) 
 
As an expression of its determination to enhance cooperation, NATO has 
launched a NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) Trust Fund project to help Ukraine 
deal with the huge Soviet-era stockpiles of ammunitions, small arms and light 
weapons.  The Project will help Ukraine destroy these aging stockpiles including 
numerous Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS).  This 30 million 
dollar initiative is the largest single demilitarization effort in the world, and the 
largest of its kind ever undertaken.  The United States has stepped forward to act 
as the lead nation for this NATO/PfP Trust Fund project, the first time the United 
States has volunteered as the lead nation. (20) 
 
Conclusion 
President Kuchma's multi-vectored foreign policy never fully aligned Ukraine with 
NATO.  His repeated use of NATO as leverage against Russia served 
simultaneously to start the reform of the Ukrainian military.  More importantly, no 
matter the political situation or rhetoric, Ukraine never stopped pursuing its NATO 
Action Plan goals.  In early 2005, President Yushchenko took command of a 
military that is much closer to NATO standards than the post-Soviet legacy 
military inherited by President Kuchma. 
 
That said, Ukraine is still several years away from joining NATO.  The country 
has significant defense reform to complete prior to achieving NATO standards.  
Additionally, if we look at the 1995 NATO enlargement criteria, Ukraine has 
significant work to do in each area: 1) established democracy; 2) respect for 
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human rights; 3) market-based economy; 4) armed forces under civilian control; 
and 5) good relations with neighboring states (resolution of internal ethnic 
disputes). (21)  President Yushchenko needs to continue his string of victories by 
having Ukraine designated as a market economy this year and receiving WTO 
membership before the March 2006 parliamentary elections.  WTO success 
coupled with further reformist success in the 2006 elections could then 
accelerate the NATO application process.  President Bush and NATO Secretary-
General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer have emphasized NATO's "open-door" policy 
that would admit Ukraine if President Yushchenko can succeed with his reforms.  
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Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Elena Selyuk 
 
MOLDOVA 
Russia vs. Voronin 
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The approaching parliamentary elections in Moldova are contested by a puzzling 
blend of political parties, most of which have very similar platforms. A month 
before the elections, yet another player has emerged in the Moldovan political 
arena – Russia. 
 
At the beginning of February, a group of Russian deputies visited Tiraspol (the 
capital of Transdniestr), without obtaining prior approval from Chisinau. Moscow's 
stated goal of the visit was to devise a plan to protect fellow Russians in this 
unrecognized republic. Moscow realizes that the Transdniestr conflict requires 
new approaches. Tiraspol did not have to wait long. Soon after the deputies' 
return to Moscow, the Duma unanimously supported Deputy Alksnis' (formerly 
known as the "black colonel") initiative to introduce economic sanctions against 
Moldova in response to Voronin's refusal to sign the "Kozak memorandum" in 
November 2003.  The most significant of the proposed sanctions are: (1) 
Supplying energy to Moldova based on world prices (excluding Transdniestr); (2) 
banning imports of alcohol products from Moldova (excluding products produced 
in Transdniestr); and (3) introducing visas for Moldovan citizens wishing to travel 
to Russia (excluding residents of the Dniestr republic). Voronin accused Russia 
of trying to interfere with the Moldovan parliamentary election campaign by 
turning the Moldovan population against the party in power. The Moldovan Prime 
Minister Vasile Tarlev stated that "certain Russian political forces are sparing 
neither effort not money to destabilize the situation in Moldova." (1) 
 
It is difficult not to agree with Mr. Tarlev. Given that the Moldovan Communists 
refused to sign the Kozak memorandum at the last minute, boycotted numerous 
CIS summits, called for the withdrawal of Russian "occupation" troops from 
Transdniestr at NATO summits, and fiercely advocated for Moldovan integration 
with Europe, it comes as no surprise that Moscow has its eyes set on eliminating 
Voronin and his party from the Moldovan political scene. Although Russia's 
intentions to remove the Communists from power are evident, it is not clear 
whom it would like to replace them. While their names may suggest differently, 
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the Communists, the Christian Democrats, the Democratic Moldova voting bloc, 
and the Social Democrats (parties that have realistic chances of obtaining 
parliamentary seats), in essence have very similar political programs, which boil 
down to bringing Moldova closer to Europe – a goal incompatible with Russia's 
geopolitical aspirations for Moldova. 
 
Moscow denies any accusation of attempts to influence Moldova's parliamentary 
elections in Moldova and claims that the well being of Russians in Transdniestr 
was its primary concern when voting for the introduction of sanctions. The 
sincerity of these words is doubtful, to say the least. Given Moscow's record of 
"selling out" Russian citizens living abroad for all kinds of useful commodities 
(gas, for example, which was the impetus behind the Russia-Turkmenistan deal 
in April 2003, which bartered the citizenship of thousands of Russians living in 
Turkmenistan for a sweetheart energy arrangement), it is unlikely that the well 
being of Russians in Transdniestr is Moscow's main concern. If there is no 
economic or geopolitical gain in sight, Russia is unlikely to act. In addition, the 
timing of such sanctions is curiously close to the parliamentary elections. The 
Kozak memorandum failed almost two years ago. Why did Moscow decide to act 
only now? 
 
It is doubtful that Russia's threats to introduce economic sanctions against 
Moldova will have the desired effect – for at least two reasons. 
 
First, the proposed sanctions will hurt the general population and not the 
bureaucrats in power. Russia is one of Moldova's main export markets. By 
closing the door to Moldovan wine producers, it dooms them to uncertain times 
and lost income. Introducing a visa regime with Moldova will mean that 
thousands of Moldovan citizens who now work in Russia will have to return to 
Moldova and, most likely, find themselves unemployed for a prolonged period of 
time. Increased energy prices will mean higher energy bills for the regular 
citizens. In a fair, transparent democracy these sanctions could have made the 
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people rise up against a government that failed them. In Moldova, however, 
where the main mass media sources are government-controlled, the ruling party 
is likely to present its own interpretation of the situation or simply not avoid 
mention of the Moldova-Russia squabbles altogether. 
 
Second, Voronin's official approval rating remains rather high. Recent opinion 
poll of the Institute for Public Policies showed that if elections were held at the 
time of the survey (mid-February), Voronin's party would have won with almost 
62 % of the vote (2) – an unrealistically high estimate, later disputed by the 
Social Democratic Party, which claimed the Communists' real approval rating 
was approximately 27.5%. (3) While both figures might lack objectivity, the fact 
that the Communist Party of Moldova is still the most popular one in the country 
is a reality. Although election results will, most likely, be rigged, it will be done in 
order to boost the percentage with which the Communists will win, rather than to 
change the winning party altogether. 
 
Consequently, due to the Communists' relative popularity and lack of objective 
information coming form the main media sources, even if the elections are 
rigged, it is dubious that mass protests will take place. The opposition, however, 
is not loosing hope. It already has "reserved" the Central Square in Chisinau for 
the purpose of holding mass protests against the falsification of the election 
results. Different opposition parties even chose various colors for the upcoming 
revolution – orange (Christian Democrats) and yellow (Democratic Moldova 
voting bloc) are the two most prevalent ones. (4) If Russia is serious about 
removing Voronin from power, it will be interesting to watch its reaction on 7 
March. 
 
UKRAINE 
Clean-up operation 
One of Yushchenko's campaign promises was to get rid of corruption in the 
government and to ensure transparency within the ruling elites. The President 
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has begun to fulfill his promises recently by opening investigations against some 
government officials and by dismissing others. The Prosecutor-General's Office 
has instituted a criminal case against the former head of the Directorate for State 
Affairs under the former president Leonid Kuchma, Mr. Ihor Bakay. The reason is 
abuse of office and illegal use of state funds totaling 3.4 million dollars. Bakay 
was said to have left Ukraine in late December 2004, right after Viktor 
Yushchenko won the presidential election. (5) The Secret Service is also 
investigating its former Deputy Chief Volodymyr Satsyuk who headed a special 
department charged with raising funds for the intelligence service. Statsyuk is 
also suspected of implication in the dioxin poisoning of the President. (6) 
Yushchenko also has issued a decree dismissing Mykola Obykhod and Serhiy 
Tuz as deputy heads of the Security Service of Ukraine. Yevhen Serhiyenko, the 
head of the directorate for fighting corruption and crime, was fired, as well. (7) At 
the end of February, Yushchenko, as he had promised, dismissed the Customs 
Service Chief, Mykola Kalenskyy. 
 
Earlier in February, Yulia Timoshenko stated that the government would 
challenge in court the privatization of nearly 3,000 businesses. There have been 
previous attempts to investigate all these cases, but they were closed following 
orders from the government. (8) "We will open a public and transparent tender, 
and you will see how we will earn three to four times more," said Yushchenko to 
a group of foreign investment bankers. (9) 
 
Yushchenko's recent dismissal of top officials and investigations of privatization 
deals undoubtedly are aimed at increasing the fairness and transparency of the 
system, but ordinary Ukrainians have not yet seen any real direct improvement in 
their lives. My aunt, a longtime resident of Ukraine, expressed concerns that 
seem almost universal in Ukraine now, "Re-privatization started in Ukraine. All 
that was sold by the former regime to their friends for nothing is being taken back 
by the government. In short, the revolution continues! I only hope that ordinary 
people will benefit from all this, as well. It can happen that the government re-
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divides everything between its own members and that will be the end of the 
democratic show!" 
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Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
GEORGIA 
We're not gonna take it anymore 
During February, Russia and Georgia had numerous opportunities to make 
progress on a number of contentious issues plaguing their relations.  For the first 
time since the Rose revolution, a Russian Foreign Minister visited independent 
Georgia, the two countries' foreign ministries held "framework" talks, and the 
Russian and Georgian parliamentary speakers met in Vienna.  However, the 
discussions generally devolved into heated rhetoric and recriminations, as 
Georgia accused Russia of reneging on past agreements and Russia again 
threatened "preemptive" terrorist strikes in Georgia's Pankisi Gorge.  
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The month began badly when Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov's February 
18 visit was downgraded by Georgia from an official state visit to a "working" 
visit.  The partial snub came after Lavrov refused to lay a wreath at the memorial 
to Georgians killed in separatist conflicts during the 1990s.   The Georgian 
government cannot have been surprised at Lavrov's response, given Russia's 
support for the separatist movements, but the country's willingness to openly 
challenge the Russian foreign minister sent a clear signal.  
 
The meeting itself between Lavrov and Georgian Foreign Minister Salome 
Zourabichvili resulted in nothing more than plans for yet another round of talks on 
the same issues that have already been discussed for years.  Putting her best 
foot forward, Zourabichvili explained, "We have agreed, and this is very 
important, on how to continue working over these issues." (1)  
 
Primary among these issues are Russia's non-compliance with its 1999 
agreement to disband its military bases in Georgia and its single-handed 
destruction of the OSCE Border Monitoring Operation in Pankisi Gorge.  
 
At the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit, Russia and Georgia signed an annex to the 
adapted CFE Treaty.   In it, Russia agreed to "disband and withdraw" its bases in 
Gudauta (Abkhazia) and Vaziani by July 2001.  The two countries also agreed 
that "during the year 2000" they would "complete negotiations regarding the 
duration and modalities of the functioning of the Russian military bases at Batumi 
and Akhalkalaki . . . ." (2)  
 
While Russia closed the small Vaziani airstrip in 2001, the country merely 
announced that the soldiers at the Guduata base within Abkhazia were now 
"peacekeepers," and therefore, its military base had been eliminated (a 
technique also used in Moldova's Transnistria separatist enclave).  Russia also 
appears to have tried to draw out, as much as possible, the negotiations over the 
"duration" of its other two bases in Georgia.  
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On December 23, 2000, after five rounds of negotiations covering almost a year, 
the two sides had barely moved forward on the question of Batumi and 
Akhalkalaki.   Russian then-Deputy Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov explained, 
"Russia offered to extend its mandate by another 15 years.  We think there's no 
necessity for a hasty withdrawal." (3)  When Georgia balked at the suggestion of 
Russian military bases on its territory for another 15 years, a spokesman at the 
Russian Defense Ministry complained about "Georgia's inappropriate attitude."  
Indignantly, he said, "Georgia is talking not about the terms and conditions of the 
functioning of the Russian military bases in Akhalkalaki and Batumi, but about 
their closure." (4)   
 
Now, more than four years later, Akhalkalaki and Batumi remain, as does 
Guduata in another form, and the two sides have reached nothing near 
consensus.  Moreover, throughout all these years, Russia has worked closely 
with the leadership of the Georgian breakaway republics.  This cooperation has 
become far more public in the last year, as Moscow has hosted several meetings 
of various representatives of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and as the country 
passed a bill making Abkhaz and South Ossetian residents – inside the 
sovereign country of Georgia – Russian citizens.   
 
At the same time, Russian rhetoric regarding Georgia's so-called support for 
Chechen terrorists has increased in the last several months. At the end of 2004, 
Russia used its OSCE veto to scuttle an extension of the mandate of the OSCE 
Border Monitoring Operation (BMO) along the Georgian-Russia border.  Lavrov 
called the mission "no longer needed" and said "it has not been instrumental in 
reducing the number of border violations."  Therefore, he said Russia's own 
border guards will control the border. (5) The OSCE BMO mission, which 
provided 24 hour monitoring of the Pankisi Gorge border crossing by 
internationally trained observers, is now closed.  
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Throughout the last several months, the Russian media have been filled with 
accounts of supposed border violations in Pankisi, along with suspiciously 
detailed descriptions of how groups of Chechens are using Pankisi Gorge as a 
base.  Russia Major-General Ilya Shabalkin, for example, related that "a gang of 
over 200 men" was near the Georgian villages of Duisi and Tsinabani, while "a 
gang near the village of Birkani includes 30 or so foreign mercenaries talking 
Turkish among themselves." (6) Meanwhile, another "source" explained that a 
"group of about 50 militants" was camped near the villages of Omalo and 
Tselebani." (7)   Russian officials explained that these "bases" were used as 
training camps and as "rest points" for Chechens hiding from Russian forces or 
needing medical treatment.  
 
However, despite repeated requests from Georgian leaders that Russia provide 
detailed information explaining when, where and how these "militants" were 
crossing the border, the country provided nothing.  Moreover, Russia apparently 
decided not to avail itself of assistance from the international OSCE Monitoring 
Operation – which may have been able to use its helicopters and other 
surveillance equipment to document Russian claims.   As it was, the monitoring 
mission found that the border was stable with little activity.   
 
Without the mission, Georgia fears that Russia will use the excuse that 
Chechens are hiding in Georgia as a pretext for military strikes within its borders.  
On February 13, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Lavrov said, "We have killed 
so many foreigners in Chechnya carrying passports with a Georgian tourist visa 
in their pockets. (Š) You can't deny they are penetrating our territory through the 
territory of Georgia, that's a fact."  (8)  However, Georgia can and does deny this 
fact, and continues waiting in vain for documents and details.  
 
The Defense Minister went on to ask, "If Š we know that some place in the world 
there are terrorists in hiding, plotting to carry out a terrorist act on the Russian 
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territory, should we wait and let them go. Š?  Or hit them straight away?  I think 
the answer is clear."  (9) 
 
Finally, Georgia appears to have had enough.  On February 24, during a meeting 
on the sidelines of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, Georgian Parliamentary 
Speaker Nino Burjanadze held an apparently difficult meeting with her Russian 
counterpart, Boris Gryzlov.   Burjanadze reported that she "informed him in detail 
about our absolutely justified complaints toward the Russian side."  Burjanadze 
said she pointed to "the border issue, the need to pull out the Russian bases as 
soon as possible, [and] the problem that Russia has been actually meddling in 
Abkhazia and Samachablo South Ossetia." (10) 
 
Most important, Burjanadze drew a line over the remaining Russian military 
bases in Georgia.  "I very openly told Mr. Gryzlov that if in the very near future we 
failed to agree on a final date for the Russian military bases pullout, the Georgian 
parliament would declare the presence of the Russian bases illegal on Georgian 
territory, and I'm sure that the rest of the authorities will also support us in this 
matter." (11)  The comment followed a similar statement made by Givi 
Targamadze, Chair of the Georgian Parliamentary Defense and National Security 
Committee.  On February 23, Targamadze said, "If Russia does not specify the 
deadline for withdrawing its bases within several months, Georgia should start 
the procedure for closing them unilaterally." He said this procedure would include 
blockading all supply routes into the bases.  (12) Already, Georgia has begun 
surreptitiously holding up visas for Russian servicemen, thus interrupting the 
rotation of personnel. (13) 
 
Burjanadze has also been vocal about the BMO mission and Russia's claims 
regarding Pankisi Gorge.   She said, "Statements made by high-ranking Russian 
officials do not allow us to conduct Russian-Georgian relations in a normal and 
civilized manner.  Those truly irresponsible statements Š clearly aim at the 
further deterioration of Russian-Georgian relations and prepare the ground for 
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justifying, on the basis of these statements, certain provocative actions to be 
taken against Georgia."  She noted, "When Georgia is left face to face with 
Russia and is not able to fall back on international observers, Russia will find it 
much easier to make allegations against Georgia." (14)  
 
Burjanadze and other Georgian leaders are now pressing international 
organizations for assistance in continuing to have some type of an international 
presence on the border.  They are also asking that international pressure be 
increased on Russia to remove its military bases. 
 
So far, NATO is refusing to ratify the adapted CFE treaty until Russia honors its 
1999 Istanbul commitments.  Also, the US recently announced the continuation 
of a training package for Georgian military and border guards.  However, the EU 
and the OSCE have offered very limited assistance on both issues.  
 
In response to this hesitance, Georgia continues to increase the pressure itself 
on Russia to pull out its bases, and is attempting to create its own international 
border monitoring group, possibly made up of former Soviet and client states.  
The country is hoping also that its recent decision to more than double the 
number of troops in Iraq – from 300 to 850 – will help convince the U.S. and 
NATO to participate in a border monitoring mission. The fact is that Georgia's 
dependence on Russian energy supplies and its economic situation will make it 
difficult for the country to take care of these issues without significant Western 
support.  Given the precariousness of Georgian-Russian relations, the Western 
international community would do well to work to eliminate any future potential 
areas of military conflict by energetically supporting Georgia's efforts to keep its 
territory free of foreign troops, and to monitor its border openly and effectively. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) "Tbilisi, Moscow Set Short-Term Agenda for Talks," Civil Georgia, 18 Feb 05 
via www.civil.ge 
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Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Fabian Adami 
 
KAZAKHSTAN 
Opposition on the verge of splitting? 
In September last year, Kazakhstan held its second parliamentary elections since 
obtaining independence in 1991. During the year preceding the polls, several 
events occurred that were to have a considerable impact on the vote. First, in 
October 2003, President Nursultan Nazarbaev's daughter Dariga formed her own 
political party, Asar, and announced her intention to run in the elections. (1) 
Nazarbaeva's emergence onto the political scene seemed to indicate that the 
long-rumored succession battle between Nazarbaeva and her brother-in-law, 
Timur Kubilayev, finally had been decided in her favor. 
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Then, in July 2004, President Nazarbaev appointed Altynbek Sarsenbayev, one 
of three co-chairmen of Ak Zhol (Kazakhstan's strongest opposition party) to the 
post of Information Minister. (2) In his first official interview, Sarsenbayev stated 
that he had accepted the position only upon receipt of a guarantee from 
Nazarbaev that elections would be conducted in an "open and honest" fashion. 
(3) Less than two weeks after Sarsenbayev's appointment, Bolat Abilov, another 
of Ak Zhol's co-chairmen, was convicted of slandering a fellow Majlis deputy, and 
barred from running in the polls. (4) It was evident immediately that these events 
were part of a concerted campaign to subvert the opposition and to clear the path 
for Nazarbaeva's ascendancy. Election returns showed that this campaign had 
been successful: Asar gained three seats in the Majlis, making it the second 
largest pro-presidential party in the country. 
 
Less than 24 hours after the election, Sarsenbayev announced his resignation, 
stating that he could not remain in a government which "actively interfered with 
the election campaign, juggled and falsified results of the expression of people's 
will." (5) The question had to be posed as to why Sarsenbayev accepted the 
President's "assurances" and took a government post. One plausible answer is 
that he wished to draw attention to the plight of opposition groups, and 
Kazakhstan's democratic deficit. 
 
If this indeed was Sarsenbayev's motivation, then he was successful. But his 
actions may have weakened even further the only viable opposition group in 
Kazakhstan.     
 
On 13 February, Ak Zhol's third co-chairman, Alikhan Baimenov, called a special 
plenary meeting of the party, and proposed a vote of no confidence in 
Sarsenbayev. Although several regional factions of the party refused to join the 
vote, the motion was passed, and Sarsenbayev's position now stands in 
question. Abilov chose to side with Sarsenbayev in calling the vote a "foolish 
escapade." (6) Baimenov apparently called for the vote due to an alleged 
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violation of party rules. Sarsenbayev has apparently been negotiating in recent 
months with Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan and the Communist Party with the 
intent of forming one joint opposition group, to be called the Coordinating Council 
of Democratic Forces. (7) The proposed triple-merger would see a joint 
candidate put forward for the Presidential elections slated for January 2006. 
Baimenov has claimed that such merger talks are not permitted by the Ak Zhol 
charter, and submitted the no-confidence motion for that reason. 
 
A dispute in the leadership of Ak Zhol apparently has been fermenting for some 
time, with the vote of no confidence merely being the first public manifestation of 
a wider problem. Baimenov and other senior opposition figures, since 
September, have been accusing Sarsenbayev of betraying the opposition's 
cause whilst serving as a Minister, because he ordered the closure of several 
media outlets that were sympathetic to the opposition's cause. (8)  
 
The war of words between the co-chairmen since the plenum has continued: 
Abilov published a statement in which he accused Baimenov of violating party 
statutes by calling for the vote against Sarsenbayev. As yet, there has been no 
indication that Baimenov has responded to this allegation. But if Sarsenbayev is 
not removed—as called for by the vote, it is possible that Baimenov will split from 
the party. Baimenov holds the sole seat gained by Ak Zhol in the parliamentary 
elections. It is not clear what would happen to the seat if he leaves the party, but 
it is possible that the seat would be put up for re-election, and that Kazakhstan's 
opposition would lose its "symbolic" presence in the Majlis. (9) At this point in 
time, Party members apparently are divided equally between the two leadership 
factions, and a decision on whether to break up the party will be made at its next 
congress, to be held on a date, as yet unspecified, in the near future. 
 
The dispute in Ak Zhol worsens an already dismal situation for the opposition in 
Kazakhstan. In January, an Almaty court ruled that Democratic Choice of 
Kazakhstan must be liquidated because statements made in December by the 
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party had effectively threatened revolution and called for "resolute public actions, 
including civil disobedience campaigns," and further, had declared Nazarbaev's 
Presidency to be "illegitimate and anti-people." (10) As yet, the party has not 
disbanded, and has moved to appeal the judgment against it. It must be stated 
that the likelihood of a successful appeal is remote. If Ak Zhol indeed splits, and 
Democratic Choice is liquidated, Kazakhstan will lack any viable opposition group 
that will be able to collect the necessary signatures to mount a challenge against 
Nazarbaev in 2006. 
 
Kyrgyzstan elections 
On 27 February, Kyrgyzstan held parliamentary elections. The three-month 
period prior to the elections witnessed several important developments. First, 
President Askar Akaev's son, and most importantly, his daughter, Bermet 
Akaeva, were nominated to stand in the election. (11) At the same time, Roza 
Otunbaeva, co-leader of Ata Jurt-one of Kyrgyzstan's leading opposition parties, 
and former Foreign Minister, was barred from running in the election. Although 
the official explanation for her exclusion was that she failed to meet residency 
requirements, it was suspicious, to say the least, that Otunbaeva had planned to 
run in the same district as Akaeva. (12) 
 
Otunbaeva's exclusion sparked a number of protests outside the Parliament in 
Bishkek. President Akaev was quick to dismiss the protesters, labeling them 
"home grown instigators" who wished to re-create Kiev's Orange Revolution. (13) 
Prime Minister Nikolai Tanayev joined in attacking the protesters, even going as 
far as issuing a thinly veiled warning that the government would be prepared to 
use force to prevent revolution if necessary. (14)  
 
That President Akaev and his government are deeply concerned about a 'Kiev 
repetition' has been shown throughout the election campaign. In an interview 
given to Nezavisimaya gazeta, Akaev accused the United States of covertly 
funding Otunbaeva's candidacy, while Tanayev warned the OSCE that any 
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outside meddling in the polls would not be tolerated. (15) At the same time, 
President Akaev attempted to appeal directly to the Kyrgyz people. In a key 
speech given at a youth rally in Bishkek, Akaev argued that the elections were a 
"test" for the country, and stated that Kyrgyzstan was immune to the "sickly 
foreign rose, orange and yellow viruses" represented by opposition figures. (16) 
 
At first glance, Akaev's appeals would seem to have fallen on deaf ears: There 
have been protests around the country for the last three weeks—including on 
election day itself. A closer look however, shows that these protests have been 
caused directly by the actions of President Akaev and his government. 
 
On 8 February, the newspaper Moya Stolitsa Novosti (MSN) published an article 
alleging that members of Akaev's family, including his children, had been 
involved in illegitimate business deals. Nine days later, President Akaev accused 
the newspaper of "systematic information terror," and threatened to sue the 
media outlet, unless a full apology was published. (17) On 22 February, the 
printing house in which the newspaper is housed, experienced a power outage 
lasting 48 hours. Freedom House protested the outage, noting that it was 
probably a deliberate attempt at "censorship," and that the action raised serious 
concerns that "the Kyrgyz government seeks to deny opposition newspapers and 
candidates a voice in the crucial pre-election period." (18)  Akaev's threat to sue 
resulted in protests in Bishkek during which calls were made for the government 
to cease harassing media outlets. As a result of the power outage becoming 
public knowledge, the protests lasted into the next day. (19) The more serious 
protests, however, have been those that have occurred nationwide in reaction to 
the barring of opposition candidates from the elections. 
 
On 22 February, a large protest involving several thousand persons occurred in 
the Naryn region, where the demonstrators blocked a major highway leading to 
Bishkek and demanded that the government reinstate opposition candidates from 
the district. A second demonstration involving similar tactics occurred at Issyk-Kul 
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Oblast, where 2500 persons used logs and garbage to block another major 
thoroughfare to protest the barring of opposition candidate former Prime Minister 
Arslanbek Maliev from the election. Similar protests on a smaller scale—
including one in Jalal-Abad Oblast involving 500 demonstrators—reportedly took 
place in three of Kyrgyzstan's seven oblasts. (20) The government's reaction to 
these protests—some of which lasted more than five days—revealed major 
concern: On 25 February, the Interior Ministry announced that it was placing all 
law enforcement personnel, including riot police, on high alert for the remainder 
of the election period. (21) There was no indication whether the military's alert 
status had also been upgraded. 
 
Until now, Kyrgyzstan's Parliament had been a bicameral body. As a result of 
recent changes, Parliament is now a unicameral institution with 75 seats. 420 
candidates competed for these seats in Sunday's election.  Preliminary turnout 
data showed that over 50% of the eligible population voted in the polls. (22) 
However, the election has proven to be largely inconclusive with preliminary 
results showing that only 30 of 75 seats were decided. (23) Run-off elections are 
expected to be held for the remaining 45 seats on Sunday, 13 March. 
 
As was the case in neighboring Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz government, together 
with CIS observers, has been insisting that there were no violations, and that the 
polls were a demonstration of Kyrgyzstan's forward progress. (24)  However, the 
OSCE, in its preliminary statement, noted that it had observed "widespread 
withdrawal of candidates from the election campaign, bribing of voters, and a low 
level of voter confidence." (25) In the interim, the most interesting developments 
are that President Akaev's son won his district, while his daughter Bermet—
running in the district previously occupied by Roza Otunbaeva—has made it 
through to a second round. President Akaev held a press conference after the 
polls closed on Sunday evening, during which he announced that he "never 
intended to launch any constitutional amendments" to extend his term, and that 
he was "not going to do so now." (26) Under the Kyrgyz Constitution, Akaev's 
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current (second) term must be his last; it is an interesting omission however, that 
President Akaev failed to address the question of whether one of his pro-
presidential allies in the Parliament might launch such an amendment for him. As 
such, Akaev's statement should not yet be taken at face value. Akaev's future 
moves may depend on his daughter's performance in the 13 March run off. 
 
Finally, although the opposition Ata-Jurt party held a small rally (which Roza 
Otunbaeva addressed) on 28 February in Bishkek, no really major 
demonstrations have been held so far since the elections. (27) It remains to be 
seen what occurs when the Central Election Commission announces the final 
results of the 30 decided seats, and what occurs in the second round of voting. 
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